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Abstract
According to the fiscal federalism literature sub-central budget constraints become softer when
local governments are more dependent on revenues over which they have no discretion. As a con-
sequence of higher ’transfer-dependency’, sub-central governments can expect to be bailed out by
the central government and therefore tend to accumulate higher levels of debt. We test this con-
jecture with data from Austrian municipalities. Austria is a fiscally highly centralized federation
in which tax autonomy at the sub-central level is almost absent. Our identification strategy is
based on a discontinuity caused by a special regulation on population weights in the tax sharing
agreement between central government and the municipalities. We analyze the discontinuity in
the conditional expectation of borrowing given population size to unveil an average causal effect of
the treatment. Our results indicate that in line with theoretical expectations municipalities with
higher revenue dependency observe higher net borrowing per capita. We also find that almost
one half of the observed discontinuity works through an investment channel. Net borrowing is
spatially correlated.
JEL classification: D72; D78; H74; H77
Keywords: fiscal autonomy; subnational borrowing; vertical fiscal imbalance; regression disconti-
nuity
1. Introduction
Among economic scholars, it is believed that carefully designed fiscal decentralization can con-
tribute to the effectiveness of the public sector and eventually to an increase in welfare. This
assumption stems from two strands of literature: on the one hand, the traditional fiscal decentral-
ization theorem (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972) points to the conclusion that local provision of public
goods is better suited to satisfy the needs of local communities. On the other hand, public choice
tradition identifies the role of decentralization in taming the “Leviathan” government (Brennan
and Buchanan, 1980), which would otherwise inefficiently overexpand at the cost of the tax payers.
Critics of decentralization point to negative economic outcomes: ill-designed fiscal decentral-
ization can produce “soft budget constraints”, which not only preclude efficient allocation of public
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money, but might in fact exaggerate the problem of over-expanding government. Creation of a
soft budget constraint is facilitated if subnational governements largely depend on transfers from
the central government. Goodspeed (2002) develops a model of central government transfer de-
cisions and inter-temporal regional spending decisions when the central government is involved
in the financing of regional governments via transfers. The model results in central government
incentives to create a soft budget constraint by increasing grants when a region borrows because
regional borrowing upsets the central government’s politically optimal allocation strategy (Good-
speed, 2002). As a result, the soft budget constraint lowers the opportunity cost of borrowing for
the subnational government.
In this work, we want to take a closer look at this result, and analyze whether higher depen-
dence of municipalities on transfers from the central government, or in other words higher vertical
fiscal gaps result in higher levels of public borrowing. We base our identification strategy on a
discontinuity present in the Austrian tax sharing agreement between the central government and
the municipalities.
2. Previous literature and predictions
The question of whether intergovernmental transfers and vertical fiscal gaps affect subnational
fiscal performance has been intensively analyzed in economic and political-science literature. The
link between vertical fiscal gaps and debt has been theoretically established by, among others,
Goodspeed (2002) and Rodden (2006). Rodden (2006) argues that grants make subcentral gov-
ernments expect central assistance if they fall into fiscal difficulty. Because the central govern-
ment already funds substantial portions of subcentral budgets, subcentral governments will find
it politically difficult to resist pleas for bailouts to avert bankruptcy. The more that subcentral
governments depend on the central government for fiscal support, the more that creditors and vot-
ers will assume that the subcentral governments are simply administrative arms of the center and
that the latter is responsible for the fiscal condition of its subordinates. Knowing this, subcentral
governments will be more likely to run up large debts in the first place – the familiar phenomenon
of moral hazard (Sorens, 2016).
Empirical evidence points to increasing subnational deficits and debts associated with vertical
fiscal gaps. Rodden (2002, 2006) finds that vertical fiscal imbalance reduces subcentral government
and total net surplus if combined with subnational borrowing autonomy. De Mello (2000) finds a
non-linear effect of grants (excluding shared revenue) on the budget surplus: deficit increases along
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with grants when expenditure decentralization is high, and decreases when it is low. Similarly
Eyraud and Lusinyan (2011) find that grants, excluding shared revenue, raise the deficit when
combined with borrowing autonomy. Counter-evidence comes from Baskaran (2010) who finds
that vertical fiscal imbalance is associated with lower debts.
As for other fiscal variables, large literature has analyzed whether vertical fiscal gaps are
associated with higher, and potentially inefficent subcentral expenditure. Potential for inefficient
fiscal performance as a result of grant financing has been recognized both by political-economy and
public-finance scholars. Whereas political economy points to the claim by Brennan and Buchanan
(1980) that the more dependent subcentral governments are on grants and shared revenue, the less
they compete with each other for geographically mobile citizens and the more they can extract
from citizens for their own benefit, public-finance scholars also recognize the dangers of vertical
fiscal gaps, which create fiscal commons problem and in turn negative externatlities on other
jurisdictions.
In light of these observations, empirical evidence exists on the dependence of the size of local
governments and grant/transfer dependence. A large number of empirical studies point to a
conclusion that dependence on grants is associated with higher government spending. Cross-
country evidence (see e.g, Jin and Zou, 2002; Cassette and Paty, 2010; Ashworth et al., 2013; Prohl
and Schneider, 2009) suggests that grants raise general, as well as subnational spending. Intra-
country studies come to mixed conclusions. Dahlberg et al. (2008) using a strong identification
strategy based on discontinuity in grants allocation concludes that equalization grants increase
general spending roughly one for one. Similarly, Volden (1999) finds that grants raise U.S. social
benefit payments, whereas cuts in grants do not decrease them. On the other hand, Gordon (2004)
concludes that block grants increase expenditure only in the short run.
Effects of vertical fiscal imbalance on government spending have been analyzed by e.g., Fiva
(2006) and Rodden (2003). Both conclude that vertical fiscal imbalance is associated with higher
general spending. Rodden (2003) also concludes that subnational spending increases along with
vertical fiscal imbalance.
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3. Institutional setting, data and hypotheses
3.1. Institutional setting
Austria is a federation of nine states (”Länder”), and 2,100 municipalities3. The country is
frequently characterized as a system of cooperative federalism, with substantial overlaps of com-
petences of governmental levels, and very low tax autonomy of states and municipalities. Around
95 percent of total tax revenues are ’joint taxes’. Among others, revenues from personal income
tax, corporation income tax, and VAT are shared among all three governmental levels, according to
the rules of the national Fiscal Equalization Law (German: ”Finanzausgleichsgesetz”, short FAG).
Even though the revenues from shared give slightly more autonomy to regional and local govern-
ments than intergovernmental grants, individual decision making sovereignty regarding taxes at
the subcentral level is nevertheless limited (c.f. Blöchliger and Petzold (2009) for a theoretical
discussion of dividing lines between grants and tax sharing arrangements). Incentives of states
and municipalities to maintain and develop their own tax base are rather weak. For a very brief
description and critic of the fiscal framework in Austria, c.f. Pitlik (2014). Austrian municipalities
receive 11.9 percent of the shared taxes revenue. In a first step, the total municipalities’ share
is divided between the nine states according to a fixed formula. In a second step, the respective
shares of the local units of a state are distributed.
Our regression discontinuity design originates from the Article §9(9) of the FAG, which stip-
ulates that depending on the population of a municipality, per capita receipts from shared taxes
are multiplied. This regulation is called “abgestufter Bevölkerungsschlüssel” (short, aBS). Depend-
ing on the state regulations, between 80 and 90 percent of the joint tax revenues are distributed
according to the aBS scheme. The payments per capita are multiplied
1. for municipalities below 10,000 inhabitants with a factor of 1 41/67,
2. for municipalities between 10,001 and 20,000 inhabitants with a factor of 1 2/3,
3. for municipalities between 20,001 and 50,000 inhabitants and statutory cities with a factor
of 2,
4. for municipalities above 50,000 and the city of Vienna with a factor of 2 1/3.
Importantly, the current shape of the aBS is in force starting from the fiscal year 2008. For the
first five year in our sample, the previous discontinuity has been larger: population of municipalities
3This number has been higher until the end of 2012, which introduced a major wave of municipal amalgations in
the federal state of Styria. As is shown in recent literature, planned amalgamations generate additional incentives
for merging municipalities to increase local debt. See Jordahl and Liang (2010), or Nakazawa (2013). Hence, we
shall exclude the municipalities located in Styria from the analysis.
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up to 10,000 inhabitants has been multiplied with a facor 1 1/2. Before 2005, the factor equated
1 1/3.
The aBS regulation dates back to the law on public finance of 1948. At that point in time
it was important to equip larger cities with additional financial means to alleviate reconstruction
of city infrastructure damaged during the Second WorldWar. Yet, the basic regulation is still in
force although the original rationale no longer exists. Currently, the main ’economic’ argument
is to compensate bigger municipalities for positive spillovers to neighboring entities, as well as a
compensation for seemingly higher per capita costs of service provision. The historic origin of the
aBS regulation leaves no doubt about is exogeneity. The 10,000 threshold has remained unchanged
since the introduction in 1948, therefore the possibility that the threshold itself is endogenous to
e.g., political negotiations between the different layers of the government is excluded.
At the population threshold of 10,000 there is a jump in the size of the per capita payments from
the pool of joint revenues to a municipality, as depicted in Figure 145. Just below the cut–off point,
the municipalities receive on average slightly less than 700 Euro per capita, whereas the payment
just above the 10,000 cut–off increases to about 800 Euro per capita. Although the “Ertragsanteile”
payments are additionally complemented by other transfers to the municipalities, Figure 2 shows,
that at a cut–off of 10,000 there is a drop in the fraction of income to a municipalities stemming
from own taxation from about 30% to about 20%. Unlike other transfer payments, revenues from
shared taxes are not earmarked, and are at a free disposal of the municipalities. Importantly, the
overall level of per capita expenditure does not change at at the cut–off, as depicted in Figure 5.
Following a basic agreement on a revision of the Fiscal Equalization scheme in 2007, the Federal
Ministry of Finance initiated a major reform debate of the population accounting method used
for the allocation of funds across jurisdictions. Due to unadjusted population figures, the pre-
reform statistics did not adequately reflect changes in size and structure of the local population.
This could lead to funding misallocation and overspending. In 2011 the hitherto employed census
method has been replaced by more accurate and annually available registry data at the sub-central
level. According to Statistics Austria, the system switch increased the transparency and accuracy
of counting, and thus also reduced both incentives and opportunities for states and municipalities
to manipulate population statistics (see Blöchliger and Vammalle, 2012).
A final aspect of the discontinuity set–up which needs to be addressed is the so-called fading-
4Scatters represent averages over 500 equally–spaced bins.
5In this study, we will not analyze the changes in borrowing at other threshold levels, as the sample becomes
unreasonably small.
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Figure 1: Revenue sharing payments (“Ertragsanteile”) per capita, in Euro
in-rule (“Einschleifungsregel”), which provides some additional payments to municipalities between
9,000 and 10,000 inhabitants, and has been introduced in 2001. These payments increase linearly
with the population i.e., each additional inhabitant over 9,000 is multiplied with a small linear
multiplier. Importantly, this regulation applied in 2005 to only five municipalities, in 2014 this
number has risen to 10. In the main specification, we shall for the moment ignore this rule. In the
robustness check section of our paper, we further report instrumental variables estimation (fuzzy
regression discontinuity), in which we instrument the 10,000 threshold with the overall shape of
the fiscal equalization rule.
We use official data on municipal finances provided by the Austrian Statistical Office for the
years 2001–2014. Excluding the state of Styria and the ”statutory cities”, there are 1,685 muncipal-
itites in the sample, 372 of which are cities. Summary statistics of all used variables are provided
in Table 13 in the Appendix. Our dataset comprises information about municipal finance between
years 2004 and 2014. The smallest municipality Gramais has 60 inhabitants, the largest Vienna
over 1.8 Million6.
6Due to a special status of the city of Vienna in the fiscal equalization law, we further exclude it from any
analysis. We also exclude ten ”statutory cities” to which special equalization schemes apply (Eisenstadt, Rust,
Klagenfurt an Woerthersee, Villach, Krems an der Donau, St. Poelten, Waidhofen an der Ybbs, Wiener Neustadt,
Linz, Steyr, Wels).
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Figure 2: Fraction of income from own taxation
Table 1: Revenue mix of Austrian municipalities in 2014 (in Euro per capita)
Inhabitants Revenue sharing p.c. Local taxes p.c. Fees p.c.
less than 2,500 786 325 249
between 2,501 and 5,000 795 418 290
between 5,001 and 10,000 782 526 320
between 10,001 and 20,000 910 559 313
between 20,001 and 50,000 1,093 554 335
more than 50,000 1,224 746 216
Source: Gemeindefinanzbericht 2014
3.2. Hypotheses
In general, tax autonomy of Austria’s municipalities is thus fairly low. Austrian municipalities
have a right to set tax rates of the real estate tax within limits set by state regulations. The federal
level is in charge of the legal definition of the tax base. Cities and towns also have some discretion
with respect to the design of local user fees and use charges. Even for the fiscally most important
municipal payroll tax (Kommunalsteuer), municipalities have no discretion over the tax; tax base
and tax rate are both fixed uniformly across all local jurisdictions by the federal government.
However, local receipts from the Kommunalsteuer are exclusively for the respective local entity.
The degree to which local governments in Austria are free to decide on own spending figures
is substantially higher than on the revenue side. In general a principle of budgetary autonomy
provides state and local governments with considerable decision-making autonomy. This holds
especially with respect to revenue shares from joint taxes and from non-earmarked transfer receipts.
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The combination of rather low tax autonomy and relatively high discretion over spending
certainly creates the familiar common pool problem. Municipal governments can decide on the
basis that higher expenditure do not correspond with local tax increases, as the resources stem
from a common pool. And the smaller the share of own tax revenues the greater are incentives to
inefficiently expand local spending, as corresponding cost increases are not fully internalized by
the local units.
Our main hypothesis is hence derived from the ”bailout” literature as well as the ”soft-borrowing”
and ”common–pool” literature. As put by Rodden (2003) ”transfer-dependent governments face
weak incentives to be fiscally responsible, since it is more rewarding to position themselves for
a bailout.” According to Von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996) budget constraints become softer
when subnational governments are more dependent on revenues over which they have no discre-
tion. Subnational decision makers might then rationally expect to be bailed out ex-post by central
government if they cause unsustainable debt figures. As joint taxes give local jurisdictions - from
the perspective of tax autonomy - only slightly more decision making power than unconditional
grants, we expect municipalities in Austria who receive higher per capita shares of joint taxes
(Ertragsanteile) also to have a higher propensity to borrowing. Moreover, Austrian municipalities
face a fairly high degree of borrowing autonomy connected with ’soft’ forms of borrowing, i.e.,
borrowing from public banks and state-owned enterprises, which inevitably leads to insufficient
control of borrowing through the financial market (Rodden, 2003; Oates, 2005).
Hypothesis 1. We expect a positive relationship between higher transfer dependency and munic-
ipal borrowing.
4. The empirical approach
Our dependent variable is borrowing per capita defined in net terms, i.e., we subtract repay-
ments of debts from ’new’ municipal borrowing during a fiscal year.
Since the assignment of fiscal revenues is a function of population, with a clear cut–off point
at the level of 10,000 inhabitants, a natural way to explore this quasi–experimental set–up is to
use a regression–discontinuity (RD) design. The muncipalities are assigned to two different groups
zi ∈ {0, 1} depending on population. The outcome, in our case municipal borrowing can, thus be
denoted:
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yi =

yi(0) if popi ≤ c
yi(1) if popi > c,
(1)
where c = 10, 000 and popi denotes the population of each municipality. Assignment is a determin-
istic function of population size and allows us to implement sharp regression discontinuity design
(Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). We analyze the sharp discontinuity in the conditional expectation
of borrowing given population size to unveil an average causal effect of the treatment:
τ = lim
x↓c
E[yi|popi = x]− lim
x↑c
E[yi|popi = x]. (2)
This term identifies the local average treatment effect at the threshold (Imbens and Lemieux,
2008):
τ = E[yi(1)− yi(0)|popi = c]. (3)
For the RD design to identify the local treatment effect some assumptions must be met. First,
the treatment assignment must be a monotone deterministic function of the assignment variable.
This holds in our study, as exogenously determined fiscal equalization law fully determines assign-
ment to treatment.
Secondly, identification is possible only if municipalities are not able to manipulate the assign-
ment variable. As stipulated by the law, population is collected yearly by the Austrian Statistical
Office. Nevertheless, we need to establish whether manipulation of the running variable is not
an issue in our study. Figures 3 and 4 present the density estimation using the McCrary (2008)
procedure and test as implemented in R software. The estimated difference in the density height
θ equals 0.21 with a standard error of 0.218. The p-value of the test equals 0.359, thus we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the running variable is not sorted. One potential critique of this
approach is that, since population is a discrete variable any observations with lie exactly at the
cut–off are automatically assigned to the first bin to the right of the threshold, which potentially
biases the test statistic. Eggers et al. (2015) suggest in this case running a McCrary test at the
cut–off value of -0.5. In this case, the value of the test statistic θ is 0.335 with a standard error
of 0.188 resulting in a p-velue of 0.0751, which further confirms that sorting is not an issue. That
is, with high probability the second assumption is satisfied.
Finally, in absence of treatment, the outcome variable has to evolve continuously with the
assigment variable in the neighborhood of the threshold. In other words, confounded treatment
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Figure 3: McCrary density test
Figure 4: McCrary density test - close up
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Figure 5: Per capita expenditure
should be excluded. If other factors create discontinuities in this relationship, a clear identification
of the local treatment effect is not possible. We document the extent of potential confounded
treatment in Appendix B. One potential distortion to our set–up could come from the discontinuity
in the council size at the threshold of 10,000 inhabitants present in three states: Carinthia, Lower
Austria and Tirol. Council size in itself could lead to higher expenditure and borrowing (see,
e.g., Egger and Koethenbuerger, 2010), as well as incidences of coalitional governments do (e.g.,
Persson and Tabellini, 2005, 2004; Blume et al., 2009). It is likely that the common–pool problem
associated with coalitional governments could become more severe in larger councils, which could
lead to higher expenditures at the threshold of 10,000. In all states, the council size increases
along with the population, but other states never use a threshold of 10,000. One way to deal with
this issue is to include the council size in the regressions with control variables. Additionally, we
run placebo tests as a robustness check, at other council–size thresholds (7,000 in Lower Austria
and 6,000 in Carinthia and Tirol.). Moreover, we report robusteness checks excluding these states.
Regression discontinuity design can be implemented either with parametric or non-parametric
models (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010; Calonico et al., 2014, for further
details).
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We implement local parametric estimation with
yit = α+ β0popit + β1zit + ΓXit + εit, (4)
on the range [z − h, z + h] weighting the observations using a triangular kernel, that is the
observations further away from the cut-off are weighted with a lower weight than the ones closer
to the cut-off. The β1 coefficient represents the regression discontinuity and β2 is the change in the
slope of the relationship at the cut–off; equation can be further augmented with, an interaction
term zit× popit, control variables X or higher polynomial order terms popkit and their interactions
with the cut-off variable. For instance, for a second–order polynomial:
yit = α+ β1zit + β2popit × 1(popit < zit) + β3pop2it × 1(popit < zit)+
+ β4popit × 1(popit > zit) + β5pop2it × 1(popit > zit) + ΓXit + εit. (5)
Alternatively, one can implement the RD design using local (linear or polynomial) non–
parametric regression. We concentrate on parametric estimations with control variables, we report
also nonparametric results. For the case of non-parametric polynomial regressions, the choice of
bandwidth is conducted with Calonico et al. (2014) procedure (short. CCT).
In the parametric regressions with addionally control for other factors which could possibly
explain the level of municipal expenditure and borrowing. Population itself is our course a run-
ning variable, but it could also potentially affect the borrowing level. The impact of population
on the level of public borrowing cannot be easily predicted, however. For instance, the size of
the population may have either positive or negative effects on public expenditure, depending on
whether the demand for public goods, and hence also public expenses, grows faster or slower than
the population (Werck et al., 2008). A number of works have found the negative relation between
this variable and the level of public spending in categories such as transport and communications,
health care, defense, and communal services (see e.g. Costa-Font and Moscone, 2009). As for so-
cioeconomic and geographic factors, we include population density as well as LAU2 urbanization
typology of the European Union to control for differences in service provision between rural and
urban areas (Sanz and Velazquez, 2002). We also include the fractions of population below 15 and
above 65 to control for the importance of local provision of (pre-)schooling services and social and
health services for the elderly. The purpose of including these in the analysis is to test whether
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these two groups of electors benefit over-proportionately from the provision of particular public
goods, such as health care or education, in comparison to the rest of the citizenry (Hayo and
Neumeier, 2012), which in turn potentially affects incentives of municipalities to overborrow.
Another variable often employed in studies concerning the determinants of public expenditure
is the average or median level of income, which intends to capture the per capita wealth of a
community and may reflect its demands for public goods and services. Moreover, local income
distribution could affect part of the expenditure, in particular the levels of expenditure on social
policies. We include as control variables the average income in a municipality and the Gini
coefficients.
Finally, political variables potentially affect the level of municipal borrowing. Increasing council
size could lead to a more severe common–pool problem in the council and, positively affect deficits
and, thus public debt (Persson and Tabellini, 2005, 2004). For example, Egger and Koethenbuerger
(2010) apply a similar regression discontinuity design to municipalities in the German state of
Bavaria, and find a robust positive impact of local council size on local spending.
5. Results
5.1. Baseline results
In this section we present the estimated local average treatment effects of the change in the
vertical fiscal gap on the levels of new borrowing on municipalities. Linear regression results of a
simple regression discountinuity are presented in Table 27. Linear regression results with additional
control variables are presented in Tables 3 and 4. In the parametric regressions, the observations
are weighted triangularly according to kwt = max(0, abs(10, 000−popit)). For the local polynomial
regressions, bandwidths are computed based on the bandwidth selection procedure developed by
Calonico et al. (2014).
In all specifications we only include municipalities within a size range between 2,000 and 20,000
residents. In smaller entities forces like suboptimal community size and/or local management in-
competence may be at work. For example, small communities frequently have difficulties in finding
qualified candidates for local mayors or other public posts8. Hence, we prefer specifications which
exclude these smaller entities, even at the cost of having fewer observations. Additionally we report
7For the presentation of the results the population cutoff has been normalized to 0 and population expressed in
1,000.
8See e.g., http://derstandard.at/2000029520805/Debatte-ueber-Gemeindefusionen-Tirol-gehen-die-
Buergermeister-aus
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Table 2: Linear regression, triangular kernel weights. All municipalities larger than 2,000 (1) and (2); cities larger
than 2,000 (3) and (4)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cut-off=1 102.67∗∗∗ 75.19∗∗ 190.18∗∗∗ 161.62∗∗∗
(3.46) (2.22) (3.98) (3.94)
Normalized population -11.86∗∗∗ -12.69∗∗∗ -21.50∗∗∗ -23.91∗∗∗
(-4.48) (-4.49) (-4.52) (-4.11)
Cut-off=1 × Normalized population 7.86 11.79
(1.09) (1.48)
Constant -14.87 -20.44 -60.67∗∗ -75.44∗∗
(-0.92) (-1.19) (-2.48) (-2.48)
Observations 6525 6525 1919 1919
Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level.
t-Statistics in parentheses; significance: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.1
results for the sub-sample of municipalities with a city status and less than 20,000 residents (and
more than 2,000). By definition every community over 10,000 inhabitants is a ”city”, but smaller
municipalities are sometimes assigned a city status (”Stadtrang”), too. While there are no legal
(de iure) differences of cities and non-cities with respect to tasks and competences, municipalities
with a city status frequently serve de facto as regional centers and agglomerations providing neigh-
boring communities with regional public goods. Hence, with a focus on municipalities with city
status the sample should be more homogeneous with respect to municipal spending composition.
The main results of our estimates without additional covariates are reported in Table 2. Across
all specifications we observe significant local treatment effects. The simple linear regressions
without covariates in Table 2 show a treatment effect of about 100 Euro increased net borrowing
per capita for the sample of municipalities between 2,000 and 20,000 residents. When we consider
the sub-sample of cities only, the effect increases to 160-190 Euro. Our results also indicate certain
’scale effects’, as (normalized) population size is always negatively related to net borrowing per
capita. Adding covariates in Table 3, the treatment effects are only slightly smaller in both
samples.
Turning very briefly to the behavior of our controls we do not find robust effects of urbanization
or population density on net borrowing. Median income is negatively related to local net borrowing
per capita in all specifications, indicating that on average poorer entities indeed are relying more
on higher deficits and debt. This may be due to both higher social spending or reduced revenues
per capita. Results for local income distribution are inconsistent and far from being significant
across specifications. We do not find any consistent results regarding the impact of local taxes on
debt levels. We could also not find any effects of municipal council size or council fragmentation
on borrowing behavior. Party effects are close to significant and appear with a negative sign
in Columns (1) and (2), but turn insignificant if we consider only citites. This is likely due
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Table 3: Linear regression, triangular kernel weights. All municipalities larger than 2,000 (1) and (2); cities larger
than 2,000 (3) and (4) with control variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cut-off=1 91.94∗∗∗ 66.11∗∗ 159.52∗∗∗ 150.67∗∗∗
(2.76) (2.05) (3.70) (3.53)
Normalized population -11.89∗∗∗ -15.63∗∗∗ -16.65∗∗∗ -20.05∗∗
(-2.90) (-2.71) (-3.43) (-2.28)
Cut-off=1 × Normalized population 10.72 6.86
(1.23) (0.56)
Urbanization 11.57 12.56 21.29 22.38
(0.89) (0.97) (0.78) (0.81)
% Post-working -391.53 -398.10 -389.25 -388.70
(-1.16) (-1.18) (-0.62) (-0.62)
% Pre-working -100.91 -98.91 -160.21 -152.35
(-0.42) (-0.41) (-0.43) (-0.41)
Population density 2.96∗ 3.00∗ 0.92 1.11
(1.72) (1.75) (0.32) (0.38)
Median Income -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02∗ -0.02∗
(-3.15) (-3.12) (-1.89) (-1.89)
Gini Income 73.15 66.97 -444.71 -437.08
(0.32) (0.29) (-0.75) (-0.74)
Payroll tax p.c. 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
(0.11) (0.09) (-0.18) (-0.22)
Real estate tax p.c. 0.27 0.28 1.38 1.38
(0.68) (0.70) (1.53) (1.53)
Other taxes p.c. 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.17
(0.35) (0.38) (0.81) (0.85)
Council size -0.11 1.45 -2.58 -1.27
(-0.05) (0.57) (-0.82) (-0.30)
HHI in council 38.64 36.50 -44.20 -46.69
(0.70) (0.66) (-0.44) (-0.46)
Absolute SPOE -41.64 -40.08 1.50 1.93
(-1.47) (-1.41) (0.05) (0.06)
Absolute OEVP -34.06 -32.15 3.16 4.20
(-1.26) (-1.18) (0.10) (0.14)
Absolute FPOE -62.00 -60.16 - -
(-0.81) (-0.77) - -
Coalitions -25.14 -23.34 -8.57 -7.48
(-0.98) (-0.90) (-0.33) (-0.29)
Constant 206.52 143.23 392.87 335.31
(1.38) (0.88) (1.47) (1.28)
Observations 6493 6493 1909 1909
Time effects YES YES YES YES
State effects YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level.
t-Statistics in parentheses; significance: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.1
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Figure 6: Net borrowing per capita
to independent local voter associations being more popular in smaller communities. Coalitional
governments are also not associated with higher net borrowing.
Municipal borrowing should be strongly related to local investment expenditures. In particular
spending on municipal infrastructure may be financed through higher deficits, and larger invest-
ment projects (in relation to budget size) possibly inflate local borrowing in the respective fiscal
year. Table 4 provides some evidence that additional investment spending indeed contributes
to higher net per capita borrowing at the local level. In all specifications investment spending
per capita has a positive and significant effect on net borrowing. Effects are of very similar size
(+0.5 Euros p.c.) throughout. Treatment effects become slightly weaker in the full sample of
municipalities larger than 2,000 residents. Columns (3) and (4) which display the results for
municipalities with city status only, the discontinuity remains significant at the 5 percent level,
although coefficients are also reduced by almost 50 percent, which is consistent with the coefficient
of the investment variable, that is that for each 1 Euro of net borrowing, about 50 cents can be
attributed to investment decisions. We cautiously conclude that almost one half of the observed
discontinuity works through an investment channel.
Results of local non-parametric regressions are presented in Tables 5 and 6 and further confirm
the results.
The local treatment effect equals (depending on the exact specification) around 90 Euro per
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Table 4: Linear regression, triangluar kernel weights - the effect of investments. All municipalities larger than 2,000
(1) and (2); cities larger than 2,000 (3) and (4).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cut-off=1 50.70 74.46∗∗ 113.56∗∗ 130.22∗∗∗
(1.58) (2.34) (2.40) (2.62)
Normalized population -8.83∗∗ -5.23 -15.09∗∗ -8.29
(-2.19) (-0.99) (-2.32) (-1.01)
Cut-off=1 × Normalized population -10.05 -13.46
(-1.18) (-1.13)
Investment p.c. 0.49∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗
(17.19) (17.21) (10.19) (10.26)
Urbanization 7.99 7.04 -0.54 -2.85
(0.76) (0.67) (-0.03) (-0.14)
% Post-working -522.50∗∗ -517.50∗∗ -3.18 -1.22
(-2.19) (-2.17) (-0.01) (-0.00)
% Pre-working -149.31 -152.22 76.96 61.75
(-0.82) (-0.84) (0.23) (0.19)
Population density 3.40∗ 3.37∗ 4.91 4.60
(1.88) (1.86) (1.33) (1.24)
Median Income -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗
(-2.06) (-2.10) (-2.19) (-2.17)
Gini Income 340.73∗ 347.49∗ -222.20 -237.53
(1.73) (1.76) (-0.37) (-0.39)
Payroll tax p.c. -0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.01
(-1.42) (-1.38) (0.05) (0.10)
Real estate tax p.c. -0.01 -0.01 0.71 0.71
(-0.03) (-0.05) (1.02) (1.01)
Other taxes p.c. -0.10 -0.10 0.02 0.01
(-1.49) (-1.54) (0.10) (0.03)
Council size 2.66 1.16 2.80 0.21
(1.33) (0.47) (0.79) (0.05)
HHI in council -43.48 -41.15 -124.99 -119.93
(-0.90) (-0.85) (-1.14) (-1.10)
Absolute SPOE 13.77 12.31 53.11∗ 52.12∗
(0.78) (0.70) (1.91) (1.88)
Absolute OEVP -18.48 -20.33 23.52 21.33
(-1.09) (-1.20) (0.83) (0.75)
Absolute FPOE -11.58 -15.62 - -
(-0.42) (-0.57) - -
Coalitions -5.24 -6.93 -1.69 -4.10
(-0.31) (-0.41) (-0.07) (-0.18)
Constant -95.14 -34.61 -26.49 86.57
(-0.84) (-0.27) (-0.10) (0.33)
Observations 5468 5468 1620 1620
Time effects YES YES YES YES
State effects YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors, clustered at municipality level.
t-Statistics in parentheses; significance: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.1
Table 5: Local polynomial regression, bandwidth=CCT. Municipalities larger than 2,000 inhabitants.
(1) (2)
Net borrowing p.c. Net borrowing p.c.
Uniform kernel Triangular kernel
p=1 121.97∗∗∗ 71.93∗∗
(2.84) (1.98)
h 1643.70 2960.71
b 3536.25 4615.02
p=2 60.99∗ 65.61∗
(1.33) (1.74)
h 3577.08 5577.38
b 5289.44 6805.12
p=3 95.31∗ 51.35
(1.86) (1.15)
h 3769.70 3319.42
b 4814.11 4217.69
p=4 66.80 33.99
(1.21) (0.68)
h 5278.13 3981.68
b 6729.49 4889.49
Observations 6572 6572
Calonico et al. (2014) robust confidence intervals.
z-Statistics in parentheses; significance: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.1
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Table 6: Local polynomial regression, bandwidth=CCT. Cities only.
(1) (2)
Net borrowing p.c. Net borrowing p.c.
Uniform kernel Triangular kernel
p=1 112.36∗∗ 96.73∗∗
(2.14) (2.05)
h 2138.59 2670.07
b 4086.28 4399.76
p=2 94.68 ∗∗ 100.66∗∗
(1.97) (1.95)
h 3609.31 3748.40
b 5583.08 5226.92
p=3 129.94∗ 67.41
(1.88) (0.96)
h 3716.84 3301.036
b 5175.64 4607.74
p=4 102.03∗ 52.60
(1.88) (0.67)
h 5189.78 4649.86
b 7015.01 5928.24
Observations 1919 1919
Calonico et al. (2014) robust confidence intervals.
z-Statistics in parentheses; significance: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.1
capita more net borrowing, or when we consider only cities around 150 Euro. Given that the
change in the vertical fiscal gap in about 10 p.p. at the threshold, this result suggest an additional
9 to 15 Euro new debt per capita for every 1 p.p. change in the fiscal gap.
5.2. Spatial dependence of borrowing
When it comes to public expenditure on the municipal level, spillovers to neighboring com-
munitites are an important factor. Local centers of activity typically provide infrastructure and
services, from which also neighboring communities profit, such as kindergartens, schools and old
age homes. Normalizing service expenditure in per capita terms as well as controlling for the age
structure of a community does not resolve the issue, as users of services will typically be registered
in their home community and use the resources of the neighbor. To account for the possibility of
spillovers we need to directly include spatial components in our regression model.
Figure 7: Muncipalities between 5,000 and 10,000 inhabitants (green) and between 10,000 and 20,000 (blue)
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Figure 8: Spatial distribution of borrowing in 2014
Figure 9: Spatial lag of borrowing
Figure 7 shows locations of municipalities which play a major role in our analysis, thus be-
tween 5,000 and 20,000 inhabitants. They often serve as service providers for smaller neighboring
communities. Table 7 shows that the spatial correlation on one coordinate degree intervals in
borrowing is a significant issue in our analysis. Positive values of Moran’s I statistic suggest that
public borrowing is spatially clustered. Judging by visual inspection of Figure 9, the issue is of
particular importance in central-east part of Austria, the state of Lower Austria.
Table 7: Moran’s I statististics for net borrowing p.c.
Band I z p-val
(0,1> 0.055 22.195 0.000
(1,2> 0.014 7.209 0.000
(2,3> 0.011 4.824 0.000
(3,4> -0.022 -6.204 0.000
Figure 10 shows the spatial distribution of the residuals from the OLS regressions with control
variables from the previous section, with fixed- and time-effects. Despite using additional controls
and regional effects, residuals from the OLS regressions show spatial dependence.
The question remains on how to handle the spatial pattern. From the economic perspective, an
appealing conjecture is that the independent variables from smaller municipalities affect borrowing
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Figure 10: Spatial distribution of the OLS residuals
levels of larger municipalities, as argued above. For infrastructure projects which benefit more than
one municipality, one can also hypothesize a positive relationship between the outcome variables
in neighboring communities. An appropriate model to consider both spillovers from independent
variables and correlated borrowing due to larger regional projects is
yit = α+ β0popit + β1zit + ρWyjt + ΓXit + ΦWZjt + εit, (6)
where
εit = λWεjt + ξij (7)
and Φ denotes the spatial dependence of independent variables Z in municipality j and the outcome
y in municipality i, and ρ is the impact of the spatial lag of the dependent variable andW is the
weighting matrix. This general specification allows also for spatial dependence of the error term.
A GMM-IV estimator for this model has been developed by Drukker et al. (2009) and Arraiz et al.
(2010) for the cross–sectional case. We implement this estimator as a pool cross–section model.
The results are presented in Table 8.
Including the spatial lag of the dependent variable reveals that indeed net borrowing is strongly
spatially correlated. Nevertheless, the local treatment effect is still significant at 1% level, although
the size of the coefficient is reduced to about 65 Euro. On the other hand, the spatial lags of
the independent variables do not significantly impact the net borrowing levels of neighbouring
communities. Party effects are more visible than in the main results, in each case large parties
being associated with lower borrowing than voter associations with a specific local focus.
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Table 8: Spatial results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SL. Net borrowing p.c. 0.53∗ 0.49∗ 0.77∗∗ 0.75∗∗
(1.95) (1.80) (2.10) (2.03)
Cut-off 72.01∗∗∗ 64.58∗∗∗ 65.12∗∗∗ 64.16∗∗∗
(3.64) (3.23) (3.25) (2.98)
Normalized population -10.07∗∗∗ -11.05∗∗∗ -11.17∗∗∗ -10.29∗∗∗
(-6.01) (-5.87) (-5.93) (-3.18)
Urbanization 16.31∗ 16.38∗ 14.81
(1.76) (1.77) (1.56)
% Post-working -312.02 -313.56 -230.67
(-1.41) (-1.42) (-1.02)
% Pre-working -29.24 -30.78 -17.91
(-0.21) (-0.22) (-0.13)
Population density 2.70∗ 2.76∗ 2.60∗
(1.87) (1.91) (1.77)
Median Income -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗
(-4.60) (-4.60) (-3.98)
Gini Income 132.09 129.80 -8.95
(0.84) (0.82) (-0.05)
SL. Pop density -0.41 -0.42
(-0.89) (-0.92)
SL. % Pre-working 43.71 43.40
(1.42) (1.40)
SL. % Post-working -37.75 -38.24
(-1.49) (-1.51)
Payroll tax p.c. 0.02
(0.80)
Real estate tax p.c. 0.19
(1.12)
Other taxes p.c. 0.02
(0.42)
Council size -0.42
(-0.24)
HHI in council 23.52
(0.63)
Absolute SPOE -42.69∗∗∗
(-2.83)
Absolute OEVP -32.71∗∗
(-2.43)
Absolute FPOE -37.44
(-0.27)
Coalitions -27.49∗∗
(-2.11)
Constant -3.59 173.31∗∗ 176.48∗∗ 191.08∗
(-0.33) (2.19) (2.23) (1.91)
Observations 6566 6566 6536 6521
Time effects YES YES YES YES
State effects YES YES YES YES
Figure 11: Local polynomial regression, p=1. Sensitivity to the choice of bandwidth = 1000, . . . , 9000.
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Figure 12: Local polynomial regression, p=1, bandwidth=CCT. Sensitivity to the choice of ρ = 0, 1, . . . , 0.9.
Figure 13: Local polynomial regression, p=1. Cities only. Sensitivity to the choice of bandwidth = 1000, . . . , 9000.
5.3. Sensitivity
Figures 11, 13 and 12 present the sensitivity of the treatment effect to the choice of bandwidth
in the non-parametric regressions. The results remain stable for the bandwidth choices of be-
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Table 9: Placebo test, cut-off 8,500, bandwidth=CCT, uniform kernel.
(1) (2)
Net borrowing p.c. Net borrowing p.c.
All municipalities Cities
p=1 -2.53 -29.18
( -0.08) (-0.51)
p=2 -16.87 -25.18
(-0.17) (-0.33)
p=3 15.30 8.33
(0.37) (0.08)
p=4 -38.13 358.45
(-0.66) (1.37)
Observations 6572 1919
Calonico et al. (2014) robust confidence intervals.
z-Statistics in parentheses; significance: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.1
Table 10: Placebo test, cut-off 11,500, bandwidth=CCT, uniform kernel.
(1) (2)
Net borrowing p.c. Net borrowing p.c.
All municipalities Cities
p=1 -23.30 -40.44
(-0.61) (-0.87)
p=2 -17.08 2.30
(-0.49) (0.05)
p=3 -15.92 -4.66
(-0.40) (-0.07)
p=4 -24.32 -41.12
(-0.55) (-0.56)
Observations 6572 1919
Calonico et al. (2014) robust confidence intervals.
z-Statistics in parentheses; significance: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.1
Figure 14: Local polynomial regression, bandwidth=CCT. All municipalities.
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Figure 15: Local polynomial regression, bandwidth=CCT. Municipalities with “City” status.
Table 11: Placebo test, cut-off 7,000, bandwidth=CCT, uniform kernel. Lower Austria only
(1) (2)
Net borrowing p.c. Net borrowing p.c.
All municipalities Cities
p=1 -20.48 68.08
(-0.33) (0.90)
p=2 21.63 32.44
(0.33) (0.29)
p=3 24.84 40.56
(0.41) (0.28)
p=4 37.91 69.62
(0.30) (0.30)
Observations 2452 805
Calonico et al. (2014) robust confidence intervals.
z-Statistics in parentheses; significance: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.1
Table 12: Placebo test, cut-off 6,000, bandwidth=CCT, uniform kernel. Carinthia and Tirol only
(1) (2)
Net borrowing p.c. Net borrowing p.c.
All municipalities Cities
p=1 86.48 -1.23
(1.49) (-0.21)
p=2 8.99 176.01
(0.08) (0.87)
p=3 -32.09 -160.02
(-0.20) (-0.76)
p=4 131.11 -226.20∗
(1.01) (-0.16)
Observations 1171 507
Calonico et al. (2014) robust confidence intervals.
z-Statistics in parentheses; significance: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.1
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tween 2,000 and 6,000 inhabitants around the threshold. For a larger bandwidth, the results turn
insignificant. Falsification test are presented in Tables 9 and 10 at 8,500 and 11,500 population
thresholds for the whole sample. There is no evidence, that spurious jumps in the net borrowing
can be observed at these thresholds. Regarding continuity of net borrowing at the population
thresholds at which the size of the council changes, regression results already suggest that no
changes in borrowing are associated with the changes in the size of the municipal council. Results
of falsification test for two population thresholds at which the size changes in the three states
(Carinthia, Tirol, and Lower Austria) at the 10,000 threshold, further confirm that the size of the
municipal council does not influence the levels of borrowing.
6. Conclusions
The second generation fiscal federalism literature shows theoretically that sub-central budget
constraints will be softer when local governments are more dependent on revenues over which
they have no discretion (Von Hagen and Eichengreen, 1996; Goodspeed, 2002; Oates, 2005). As
a consequence of reduced fiscal accountability, sub-central governments can expect to be bailed
out by the central government and therefore tend to accumulate higher levels of debt. We test
this conjecture using data from municipalities in Austria. The highly centralized fiscal framework
in Austria is characterized by an exceptionally low financial responsibility of state and municipal
governments to cover spending with own taxes and user fees. The excessive dependency of states
and local entities on shared tax revenues and transfers from the central government is particularly
likely to produce such negative incentives.
Employing a regression discontinuity design which utilizes a special regulation in the Austrian
tax sharing agreement we find that, in line with theoretical expectations, municipalities with higher
revenue dependency observe higher net borrowing per capita. Almost one half of the observed
discontinuity works through an investment channel. The results in this paper thus confirm the
notion that bad designed fiscal decentralization can be a potential source of over-spending and
deficit bias, when sub-national governments fail to fully internalize the cost of financing additional
spending.
Recent scholarly proposals for a reform of the Austrian fiscal framework, including the idea to
substantially increase sub-national tax autonomy, hence point in the right direction: A resulting
lower fiscal gap is supposed to harden the budget constraint for Austrian municipalities and would
have positive effects on fiscal performance. The future prospects concerning a fundamental reform
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of intergovernmental fiscal relations to reduce fiscal imbalances in Austria are, however, rather
weak. Both regional and local governments are unwilling to adopt reforms that would increase
fiscal transparency and accountability. All attempts for the introduction of only very moderate
elements of local tax autonomy and fiscal competition at the state and the municipal level failed
over the past decades, as this is obviously not in the interest of political actors at all governmental
levels.
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Appendix A
Table 13: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Population 19677 2400 2394 53 19974
Net borrowing p.c. 13718 105 416 -2250 18949
Revenue share p.c. 19677 684 119 128 2191
Debt p.c. 19527 1954 1751 .0692 44685
Pop Density 19677 1.24 2.16 .00981 38.7
Mean Income (in 1,000 Euro) 15753 19.42 2.02 8.34 29.80
Gini Income 15470 .33 .02 .24 .52
% Pre-working 19677 .162 .0274 .0394 .331
% Post-working 19677 .224 .0388 .108 .518
Council Size 19677 18.9 5.78 9 37
HHI in Council 15041 .489 .136 .137 1
Figure 16: Continuity: Fraction of population above 65
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Figure 17: Continuity: Fraction of population below 15
Figure 18: Continuity: Population density
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Appendix B
Table 14: Regulations affecting the 10,000 threshold
State Regulation Source Note
Burgenland – –
Carinthia The size of the council increases from 27 to 31
members
§18(1) K–AGO It changes also at other thresholds
The wage of the mayor changes §29(1-5) K–AGO
Obligatory higher education of the head of the
public service
§78(2) K–AGO
Lower Austria The size of the council increases from 33 to 37
members
§19(1) NÖ–GO It changes also at other thresholds
Council can choose a third vice-mayor §24(1) NÖ–GO Second vice-mayor at 2,000 threshold
The council executive body increases from seven
to eight members
§24(1) NÖ–GO
Salzburg – –
Tirol The size of the council increases from 19 to 21
members
§22(1) TGO It changes also at other thresholds
Upper Austria Obligatory higher education of the head of the
public service
§37(1) Oö. GemO
The necessary support for calling a referendum
increases from 900 to 1,400 inhabitants
§38(1) Oö. GemO
Vorarlberg – –
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